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1.  Introduction 
1.1.  Indefinites and scope 
The principal  characteristic  of  specific indefinites is that  they have a predilection  for 
taking wide scope (I will argue eventually that specificity has nothing to do with scope, 
in the grammarians'  sense, but for the time being I will use the notion as an expository 
device for distinguishing between readings): 
(I)  a.  After all that effort and time they now don't know where 40 per cent of it 
is. (New Scientist, 24 April 1999; the neuter pronoun refers to 182 
kilograms  of  plutonium  dumped  into  the  Irish  Sea by  the  Sellafield 
nuclear plant.) 
b.  All critics who were invited to cornrnent on some poems written by a 2- 
year-old bonobo hailed them as mature masterpieces. 
The  indefinite NP '40 per cent of  it'  in  (la) occurs  within the syntactic scope of  a 
negation  sign and an attitude verb, but it is interpreted as if they weren't there; for what 
the sentence means is something like:  '40 per cent of the plutonium  is such that they 
don't  know where it is.'  The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for the indefinite 'a 2-year- 
old  bonobo'  in  (lb). Observations  like these have been  taken  to  show  that  specific 
indefinites always take widest scope, or even that they ate referential expressions (e.g. 
Fodor and Sag 1982), but as examples given already by Kasher and Gabbay (1976) and 
Farkas (1981) demonstrate, neither claim is correct: 
(2)  a.  Now, after all that effort and time, they say they don't know where 40 
per cent of it is. ( New Scientist, 24 April 1999) 
b.  Each student has to come up with three arguments which show that some 
condition proposed by Chomsky is wrong. (Farkas 198  1) 
" 
This is a truncated  and emended vcrsion of a paper that has been out in the open for two years now 
(Geurts 1999h). I have excised a section that in the meantime appeared as a squib in Linguistic Inquiry 
(Geurts 2000a), whcre il is argued that spccific indefinites cannot in gencral be construed in sihl, or in 
other words, that movement of some sort is callcd for; hcre it will he taken for granted that this is so. 
Furthermore,  I  now  take  a  fresh  tack  in  my  attempt at routing  the  widespread  belief  that  specific 
indefinites  'refcr'  to entities that are known to the speaker, though not (or at least not necessarily) to 
the  hcarer  (9  1.2). Paul  Dekker's  comments  made  me  see  that  my  first  attempt  was  not  entirely 
successful, and although I have not yet given it up altogether, I decided to give it a rest for the time 
being. The remainder of the current version is virtually identical to its predecessor. For comments and 
discussion I am indehted to Reinhard Blutner, Paul Dekker, Brenda Kennelly, Rob van der Sandt, and 
Henk Zeevat. 
ZAS Papers in Ling~listics  24, 2001, 191-214 c.  The police  report  might  indicate  that  Mary  wants  to  marry  a  Swede. 
(Kasher and Gabbay 1976) 
((la) occurred  in  a caption, and (2a)  in  the  text,  of  the  same article.) The intended 
interpretation  of  (2a)  presumably  is  that  'they  say  that  40  per  cent  of  the  dumped 
plutonium  is  such  that  they  don't  know  where  it  is,'  and  the  same holds,  mutatis 
mutundis, for the prepositional object in  (2b) and u Swede in  (2c). Hence, in  each case 
the specific indefinite is interpreted as if  it occurred midway between  its actual surface 
position and the outermost scope-bearing expression. 
In all these examples there appears to be mismatch between the position at which an 
indefinite appears and its preferred interpretation. Following many of the more recent 
contributions to the literature, I will assume that this is the hallmark of  specificity (e.g. 
Ahusch  1994, Reinhart  1997, Winter 1997, van Geenhoven 1998). Such mismatches are 
not  the  norm:  indefinites  are often  interpreted  in  situ, and  there  is  some reason  for 
taking  this  to  be  the  default  option. The  reason  is  that  comparatively  'neutral',  i.e. 
semantically  attenuate,  indefinites  have  a  preference  for  in  situ  readings,  as  the 
following pairs illustrate: 
(3)  a.  Several students reported that they had been harassed by a professor. 
b.  Several  students reported  that  they  had  been  harassed  by  a professor 
emeritus from the law faculty. 
(4)  a.  Several students reported that they had been harassed by professors. 
b.  Several  students  reported  that  they  had  been  harassed  by  professors 
wearing false beards and pink gowns. 
Both (3a) and (4a) are more likely to be understood with the sentence-final indefinite 
interpreted in  situ. It is only when  these expressions become  'heavier'  that  a specific 
reading is enforced, as (3b) and (4b) illustrate. Note, incidentally, that  (4b) belies the 
popular view that bare plural indefinites are always construed hz  situ. It may be the case 
that they like such readings better than most other indefinites do, but bare plurals allow 
for specific constmals, too. 
On the strength of  these observations it may be assumed that  in  situ interpretations 
are the rule, and specific interpretations the exception. Van Geenhoven (1998) suggests, 
furthermore, that  wide-scope  constmals  of  specific  indefinites  are  preferred,  ceteris 
pc~rihus,  to intermediate-scope construals. I believe that she right  about this, though it 
must be conceded be that intuitions are rather subtle. At any rate, the argument must be 
along the same lines as previously: 
(5)  a.  Every city was represented by twelve athletes sponsored by a brewery. 
b.  Every  city  was  represented  by  twelve  athletes  sponsored  by  a  local 
brewery. 
(6)  a.  Every newspaper featured multiple reviews of a gothic novel. 
b.  Every newspaper featured multiple reviews of a gothic novel  written  by 
its editor-in-chief. 
Setting  in  situ  readings  aside, it  seems  to  me  that  in  the  (a)  sentences  there  is  a 
preference  for  construing  the  sentence-final  indefinites  as  having  wide,  rather  than intermediate, scope. The balance tips, however, when the indefinites are enhanced with 
material  enabling a  link  with  the universally quantified  subject,  as the  (b) examples 
demonstrate. These  observations  support  van  Geenhoven's  claim that,  all  else being 
equal, wide-scope readings are more easily obtainable than intermediate-scope ones. It 
bears  emphasizing  that  these  preferences  hold  ceteris  purihus  only,  and  are  easily 
overridden  by  considerations  of  plausibility,  as  indeed  the  examples  in  (3)  to  (6) 
demonstrate. 
We  thus  arrive  at  the  following  preference  order  on  the  range  of  possible 
interpretations of indefinite NPs: 
in situ < wide scope < intermediate scope 
Needless to say, this is a puzzling pattern, to put it mildly, but we will see later on how 
it can be accounted for in a principled manner. 
1.2.  No need to know 
There is a widespread belief that in order for an indefinite NP to be used with a specific 
interpretation, the speaker must have a particular individual  in  mind  (e.g. Kasher and 
Gabbay 1976, Fodor and Sag 1982, Manga 1996, Kratzer  1998, Yeom  1998, van Rooy 
1999). It  might  be  thought  that  this  explains the  unmistakable  family  resemblance 
between specific indefinite NPs, on the one hand, and definite NPs, on the other (which 
will be documented at some length in the next section). Just as a speaker employs the 
definite article  to  signal  that  an  individual  is  given  as  part  of  the  common  ground 
between him and the hearer, he employs a specific indefinite if he wants to indicate that 
an  individual is known to him, though not to his audience. In short: while definiteness 
implies givenness to speaker and hearer, specificity implies accessibility to the speaker 
alone.  (For  obvious  reasons,  there  are  no  linguistic  devices  for  signaling  that  an 
individual is accessible to the hearer alone.) 
This view  on  specificity is untenable.  As  Haspelmath  (1997) points  out, there are 
many languages that allow indefinite NPs to be morphologically flagged as 'unknown 
to the speaker', but the use of  such flags doesn't  entail non-specificity. For example, 
German  'irgendein  N'  conveys that  the  speaker doesn't  know  the N  in  question,  but 
may well be used specifically: 
(7)  Wilma hat vor, irgendeinen Schweden zu heiraten 
Wilma intends some-or-other Swede to marry. 
But even in the absence of explicit morphological  clues. there are many cases in which 
it is simply false, intuitively speaking, that the witness of  a specific indefinite must be 
known  to the  speaker.  This  is  especially problematic  when  specific  indefinites  take 
intermediate  scope, but  these  are  not  the  only  cases.  Consider  (la), for example. It 
would  be  patently  wrong  to  say  that  the  author  of  this  sentence  must  have  had  a 
particular  portion  of  plutonium  in  mind; yet there  can  hardly  be  any  doubt that  the 
indefinite '40 per cent of it'  is being employed in a specific sense. Whatever it may be, 
having something in mind is not a prerequisite for specificity. 
Having  arrived at this conclusion, we  should ask ourselves how  we can recognize 
specificity  in  the  absence  of  telltale  scope-bearing  expressions. The  answer to  this 
question, I submit, is that by and large we can't. That is to say, the chief problem for a theory of  specificity is to  account for the interaction  between  specific indefinites and 
further scope-bearing expressions occurring in  the same sentence. (I am still using the 
notion of scope in  a theory-neutral  sense, and these remarks will not prevent me from 
claiming, later on, that indefinites, be they specific or non-specific, don't have scope.) 
Apart from that, I know of only one phenomenon which might fall under the purview of 
a theory of specificity: 
(8)  At the party, Fred danced with an Irish woman, and so did Barney. 
This sentence may or may not be construed as implying that Fred and Barney danced 
with  the  same woman, and  if  this  is to  do with the fact that  the  indefinite  'an Irish 
woman'  is either specific or non-specific, as suggested by  Kasher and Gabbay (1976), 
then  this  is a case in  which  specificity manifests  itself  even  in  the absence of  other 
scope-bearing expressions. 
1.3.  Similarities between specific indefinites and definites 
It  was hinted already that, in certain respects, there is a resemblance between  specific 
indefinites  and definite expressions. In  fact, the  similarities are quite striking, as the 
following observations will demonstrate, and if  these facts may be taken at face value, 
any  theory  of  specificity worth  its  salt  should be  able to  explain  why  definites  and 
specific indefinites are so much alike. 
1.3.1.  Scope 
The hallmark of  specific indefinites is that they tend to take scope over anything else in 
the  sentence,  which  is  characteristic  of  definites,  too.  One example  will  suffice  to 
illustrate this well-worn observation: 
(9)  All critics who were invited to comment on some poems written by Barney's 4- 
year-old son hailed them as mature masterpieces. (cf. (I  b)) 
This is most likely to be read as implying that Barney has a 4-year-old son who wrote 
all the poems presented to the various critics. Of course, definites can take 'intermediate 
scope', too, as (lo) demonstrates: 
(10)  All critics who were invited to comment on some poems written by their spouses 
hailed them as mature masterpieces. 
If  the  possessive  pronoun  is  bound  by  the  subject NP,  it  is  of  course impossible to 
obtain  a  wide-scope  reading  for  the  definite  expression  their  .spouses;  but  an 
intermediate  reading remains  feasible - indeed, it  is  the most  natural  reading in  this 
case. One respect  in which  definites differ from indefinites at large is that it is quite 
difficult to obtain  something akin to in situ readings for the former, whereas we have 
seen  that  the  latter prefer  such  readings. Narrow-scope  readings  for definite  NPs  do 
occur, though: 
(1 1)  That wasn't Fred's wife, you blockhead: Fred isn't even married! But  such examples are clearly marked. Hence, although  definites and  indefinites  are 
quite similar in the way they interact with  scope-bearing expressions, their preferences 
in this regard are different. To summarize: 
definites: wide scope < intermediate scope < in situ 
indefinites: in situ < wide scope < intermediate scope 
1.3.2.  Partitives 
As Ladusaw  (I  982) was the first to point out, the nominal constituent of  a partitive PP 
must be definite or specific; non-specific indefinites and quantified NPs are not allowed 
in this position: 
(12)  Fred is one of  {the / several / *most 1 *all / *sm / +0)  employees who will be 
fired. 
Here sm represents unstressed some, which has a distinct preference for a non-specific 
reading, like the bare plural, indicated by '0'. 
1.3.3.  Indefinite this 
Although formally this is a definite article, it sometimes appears to function as if it were 
indefinite  (see  Prince  1981  for  discussion):  (13)  There  is  this  giant  spider  in  the 
cupboard.  When  used  in  this  manner,  this-NPs  function  as  indefinites  because, 
intuitively,  they  introduce  discourse  entities  that  are  new,  an  intuition  which  is 
confirmed by the following example: 
(14)  Yesterday, our little daughter brought  [a giant spider], into the house, and now 
there is [this giant spider], in the cupboard. 
In  addition, indefinite this-NPs behave more like specific than non-specific indefinites, 
because they typically take wide scope: 
(1 5)  a.  If this giant spider is still in the cupboard, Betty will go berserk. 
b.  There is a giant  spider, and if  it is still  in  the cupboard, Betty  will  go 
berserk. 
c.  If  there is (still) a giant spider in the cupboard, Betty will go berserk. 
(1%)  is more or less synonymous with (15b), rather than (15c), which is precisely what 
one should expect if  'this giant spider' were specific. 
These observations indicate that indefinite this-NPs are expressions that are marked 
for definiteness but,finction as specific indefinites. It is hard to see how this mixing up 
of  form  and  function  could  occur  unless  specificity  and  definiteness  are  kindred 
phenomena. 
1.3.4.  Cross-linguistic  evidence 
Perhaps the most telling piece (or better: collection) of  evidence is that in language after 
language  definiteness  and  specificity  are  lumped  together  into  the  same  morpho- 
syntactic rubric. I will give a handful of more or less arbitrarily chosen examples. Bemba: 
In Bemba, a Bantu language, there is a class of nominal prefixes of the form consonant- 
vowel, and another class of  the form vowel-consonant-vowel. The former are used to 
mark  non-specific  indefinites,  while  the  latter  alternatively  convey  definiteness  or 
specificity. The following examples are from Givdn (1978); here and in  the following 
glosses are as in the original source: 
(16)  a.  m-ana  a-a-fwaaya d-tabo. 
vcv-child he-past-want cv-book 
'The child wanted a book (be it any).' 
b.  m-ana  t-a-&-somene  G-tabo. 
vcv-child neg-he-past-read cv-book 
'The child didn't read alany book.' 
c.  m-ana  a-a-fwaaya g-tabo. 
vcv-child he-past-want vcv-book 
'The child wanted the book' or 'The child wanted a specific book.' 
Samoan: 
Samoan is similar to Bemba in  that it has two articles, one of which signals non-specific 
indefiniteness,  while  the other  combines specificity and  definiteness  (examples from 
Lyons 1999): 
(17)  a.  Sa i ai  ulug2li'i'o  Papa  tane a 'o Eleele  fafine. 
Past exist Art couple Pres P. Art husband but Pres E. Art woman 
'There was a couple, Papa, the husband, and Eleele, the wife.' 
b.  'Au-mai  niu. 
take-Dir Art coconut 
'Bring me a coconut.' 
West Greenlandic Inuit: 
In  West-Greenlandic  Inuit,  an  ergative  language,  transitive  verbs  may  become 
intransitive by incorporating their objects. This shows itself, among other things, in the 
case  marking  on  the  subject,  which  is  absolutive  for  intransitive,  and  ergative for 
transitive subjects. Moreover, it is only in transitive constructions that verbs bear object- 
agreement markers. The object of a transitive construction receives absolutive case, and 
may  be  either  specific  or  definite,  while  incorporated  objects  are  non-specific. 
According to Manga (1996), this is typical of ergative languages. The following sample 
of West-Greenlandic Inuit is from van Geenhoven (1998): 
(1 8)  a.  Angunguaq tikip-p-u-q. 
A.Abs arrive-Ind-Intr-3sg 
'Angunguaq arrived.' 
b.  Angunguaq aalisakka-mik neri-v-u-q. 
A.Abs fish-Inst.sg eat-Ind-Intr-3sg 
'Angunguaq ate fish.' c.  Arnajaraq aalisaga-si.nngi-I-a-q. 
A.Abs fish-buy-Neg-Ind-Intr-3sg 
'It is not the case that Arnajaraq bought {a  1  more than one) fish.' 
d.  Angunguu aalisagaq neri-v-a-a. 
A.Erg fish-Abs eat-Ind-Tr-3sg.3sg 
'Angunguaq ate thela particular fish.' 
St'it'imcets: 
St'it'imcets  (Lillooet Salish) features an indefinite article which can only occur within 
the scope of  a negative expression, a question, a modal, and so on. In  the absence of 
such operators another article must be used, which has a specific-definite function. The 
following examples are from Matthewson (1999): 
:19)  a.  Cw7aoz kw-s ats'x-en-as &  sqaycw 
Neg Det-Nom see-Tr-3Erg Det man 
'Slhe didn't see any men.' 
b.  *~ts'x-en-as  sqaycw. 
see-Tr-3Erg Det man 
'Slhe saw a man.' 
(20)  a.  Hliy-lhkan ptakwlh, pt6kwlh-min lts7a ~ smkm'lhats-a  . . . 
going.to-lsg.Subj tell.story tell.story-Appl here Det woman.Dimin-Det 
'I am going to tell a legend, a legend about a girl . . .' 
b.  Wa7 ku7 ilal lati7  smCm'lhats-a 
Frog Quot cry Deic Det woman.Dimin-Det 
'The girli was crying there.' 
This sample will suffice to show that many languages treat definiteness and specificity 
as related notions, which together stand in  opposition to non-specific indefiniteness. In 
conjunction with the evidence of the preceding sections, this raises the question what it 
is that  definites  and specific  indefinites have in  common. In  my opinion, one of  the 
main criteria for assessing theories of  specificity should be how good their answers to 
this question are. 
1.4.  Specificity and distributivity 
It has been argued by Reinhart (1997) and Winter (1997) that specific indefinites which 
have escaped from a scope island don't allow for a distributive interpretation. Reinhart 
credits Ruys with this  insight; Winter attributes  it (collectively) to Ruys and himself. 
Reinhart cites example (21a) from a manuscript by Ruys: 
(21)  a.  If three relatives of mine die, I will inherit a house. 
b.  There are three relatives of  mine such that, IF they all die, I will inherit a 
house. 
c.  There are three  relatives of  mine such that, if  any of  them  dies, I will 
inherit a house. On the most likely reading of  (21a) the indefinite 'three relatives of  mine' is construed 
with  narrow  scope, but  if  it gets a specific reading  and outscopes the  if-clause, then 
according to Reinhart, Ruys, and Winter, it can only be understood collectively. That is 
to say, if  the indefinite is specific, (21a) is synonymous with (21b), not (21~). 
This observation is not quite correct, however; what Reinhart et al. have found is not 
3 lawful correlation but merely a trend. First, as noted by Matthewson (1999), there are 
native speakers of  English who manage to obtain  a distributive reading for (21a), and 
the  same holds  for parallel  sentences  of  other  languages. Secondly, van  Geenhoven 
(1998) points  out that  intuitions  shift markedly  when  we  vary  the example. Thus it 
appears to be easier to get a distributive reading for the following sentence: 
(22)  If  some relatives of mine invite me for dinner, I will panic. 
In  short, although in environments like (21a) or (22) specific indefinites seem to prefcr 
collective construals, specificity does not entail collectivity. This is bad  news for two 
rather different theories of  specificity. On the one hand, theories that seek to deal with 
specificity  with  the  help  of  quantifier  raising  will  be  embarrassed  by  the  fact  that 
specific indefinites disprefer non-distributive readings. On the other hand, theories that 
rely on choice-functions instead of quantifier raising will find it quite difficult to explain 
the  distributive  readings - a  point  which  Winter  (1997) emphasizes, because  he  is 
confident, apparently, that such readings don't occur (for further discussion, see Geurts 
2000a). 
There  is  one  family  of  theories  that  can  account  for  distributive  as  well  non- 
distributive readings: these are theories which, on the one hand, resemble the quantifier- 
raising approach in that their account of specificity is based on movement, while, on the 
other  hand,  they  agree  with  the  choice-function  approach  that  indefinites  aren't 
quantifier expressions. Two such theories are discussed in the second half of this paper. 
2.  The binding theory of presupposition 
In  the  remainder  of  this  paper  I  present  a  unified  account  of  specificity  and 
presupposition, which is based upon the binding theory of presupposition, so before we 
move on I want to quickly recapitulate the main tenets of that theory; for more extensive 
discussion, see van  der Sandt (1992), Geurts  (1999a), and  Geurts and van  der Sandt 
(1999). 
The binding theory is an extension of discourse representation theory (Kamp 1981), 
and consists of three principal claims. The first of these is that anaphora is a species of 
presupposition,  and  that  the  standard  presupposition-inducing  expressions  (such  as 
definite NPs, factives, transition  verbs,  and so on) differ  from pronominal  anaphors 
mainly in  that  they possess a richer semantic content. This difference explains why in 
general presupposition  inducers, unlike anaphoric pronouns, can be interpreted by way 
of  accommodation, which is the second key notion in the theory. Finally, it is assumed 
that the process  of  presupposition  projection  is subject to certain constraints. It  is the 
status of these constraints that will be especially important in  the following. 
Formulated  in  procedural  terms,  the  binding  theory  predicts  that  if  an  utterance 
contains a presupposition-inducing  element, the hearer will initially attempt to bind the 
presupposition  to  a  suitable  antecedent,  just  as  he  would  try  to  bind  an  ordinary 
anaphor. If  the presupposition cannot be so bound, it will be  accommodated, i.e. it will be inserted in  some accessible discourse representation  structure (DRS). In  general the 
number of  positions  at which  a presupposition  may be  accommodated  is greater than 
one, and if  it is the choice is restricted by various constraints, but before I turn to these, 
let me first illustrate the workings of the theory: 
(23)  If Fred is gay, then his son is gay, too 
This sentence contains (at least) two presupposition-inducing  expressions: the definite 
NP his son, which triggers the presupposition that Fred has a son, and the focus particle 
too, which triggers the presupposition  that  someone different  from Fred's  son is gay. 
Note that  the first presupposition  is  'inherited'  by  the sentence as a whole, while the 
second one is not: normally  speaking, an utterance of  (23) would license the inference 
that (according to the speaker) Fred has a son, but not that someone else besides Fred's 
son is gay. The binding theory accounts for these observations as follows. Suppose that 
the grammar assigns (23) the intermediate semantic representation in (24a). I assume for 
convenience that most interpretative problems have been cleared out of the way already, 
and that the only thing that remains to be done is resolve the presuppositions triggered 
by  his  son  and  roo,  which  are  marked  out  by  single  and  double  underscores, 
respectively. 
(24)  a.  [x: Fred(x), [: gay(x)l*  [g ,  v : x's-son ( u ), gu  (y), m,  gay(u)l] 
b.  [x,  U:  Fred(x), x's-son(u), [: gay(x)] a  [v :  (x),  V,  gay(u)]] 
c.  [x,  u: Fred(x), x's-son(u), [v: v = x, gay(x), gay(v), v #u]  [: gay(u)]] 
d.  [x, U:  Fred(x), x's-son(u), [: gay(x)] a  [: gay(u)]] 
(24a)  is  the  initial  semantic  representation  correlated  with  (23),  in  which  two 
presuppositions remain  to  be  resolved.  One of  these, that  Fred has  a son, cannot be 
bound, and therefore must be  interpreted by  way  of  accommodation. Now  there  is a 
general  constraint  on  presupposition  projection  to  the  effect  that  any presupposition 
prefers  to  be  projected  to  as  high  a  position  as  possible,  and  accordingly  our  first 
presupposition  is  accommodated  in  the  principal  DRS,  which  yields  (24b).  The 
remaining  presupposition,  triggered  by  the  focus  particle,  can  be  bound  in  the 
antecedent of the conditional; this results in (24c) which, assuming that Fred and his son 
are different persons, is equivalent to (24d). 
The binding theory may be summed up in the following three principles: 
(A)  Presuppositions must be projected (i.e., bound or accommodated) 
(B)  Binding is preferred to accommodation. 
(C)  A presupposition must be projected to the highest possible DRS. 
It  will be evident that none of these principles is absolute, although the first two may be 
more  absolute  than  the  third  one.  They  are  all  subject  to  general  constraints  on 
interpretation, which  require that  an interpretation  be consistent, coherent, and so on. 
Before  these  principles  come into  play,  presuppositions  are  merely  representational 
structures, and  are  therefore completely  inert. Principle  A drives  away the inertia by 
insisting that  presuppositions be either bound  or accommodated. Principle B captures 
the insight that accommodation is a repair strategy: in principle, a presupposition wants 
to be bound, but  if  it cannot be bound  it will be accommodated. Principle C may be 
viewed  as  a  generalization  of  a  constraint  first  proposed  by  Heim  (1983).  Heim distinguishes between  two types of  accommodation: global  and local. In  terms of  the 
present framework, a presupposition is accommodated globally if it goes to the principal 
DRS, and locally if  it  is accommodated  in  the DRS  where  it  was triggered.  Heim's 
proposal is that, in general, global accommodation is preferred to local accommodation, 
and principle  C generalizes this  in  two ways. First, this principle applies not  only to 
accommodation  but  to  projection  in  general.  This  makes  some  difference  from  an 
observational  point  of  view  (though  not  much),  and  it  is  surely  more  attractive 
conceptually speaking. Secondly, although it is possible to capture Heim's distinction 
between  global  and  local  accommodation  in  our framework, the  distinction  as  such 
doesn't play a role in the theory. In general, there is a line of accessible DRSs in which 
a presupposition can be accommodated, the two ends of this chain being the main DRS 
and the DRS where the presupposition arises. Global and local accommodation are just 
convenient labels for referring to accommodation in these DRSs, but they do not denote 
special processes. 
I  should  like  to  stress  that  the  fundamental  insight  underlying  this  treatment of 
presuppositions  is  not  a  controversial  one.  It  is  that  presupposed  information  is 
information that is presented as given. Most extant theories of presupposition accept this 
premise, too. What distinguishes the binding theory from other accounts is just  that it 
doesn't draw  a sharp line between  presupposition  and anaphora. Hence, although the 
choice of framework is essential in  some respects, the gist of  my  analysis of specific 
indefinites could be expressed in other frameworks, too. 
To say that  presupposed  information  is  presented  as given  is not  to  say that  it  is 
given. Indeed, the concept of  accommodation merely puts  a label  on  the observation 
that speakers are wont to exploit (in Grice's sense) presupposition-inducing expressions 
in order to convey information that is new. The point is a familiar one, I take it, but it 
deserves to be stressed, because it is sometimes thought that accommodation will be the 
weak spot of  any theory of  presupposition that adopts the notion, as most of  them do 
(see Abbott 2000 for a recent attack along these lines). Even if it could be demonstrated 
that, say, definite NPs are regularly  used to refer to entities that are new  (and Abbott 
maintains that this has been  demonstrated), that wouldn't even begin to show that the 
standard  view  of  presupposition  is  on  the  wrong  track. It  would  merely corroborate 
what we knew already, namely that speakers are adept at exploiting (still in the Gricean 
sense) linguistic devices for their purposes. 
3.  Accommodating indefinites 
Recently, it  has been  suggested by  several independent sources that specificity should 
be handled in terms of, or at least in conjunction with, presupposition projection (Cresti 
1995, Yeom  1998, van  Geenhoven  1998). This  is  an  attractive idea, as I will  try to 
show, but  it  requires  a  dramatic  change of  perspective,  too,  because  it  implies that 
specificity is an  essentially prugmafic phenomenon.  Following these developments, I 
will present my own unified theory of presupposition  and specificity in the next section. 
In  many  respects, my account is related as well  indebted to van  Geenhoven's, which 
will therefore be discussed first. 3.1.  Incorporation vs. accommodation 
The majority position  in  the literature on specificity is that  indefinites are ambiguous 
between  specific  and  non-specific  readings.  Van  Geenhoven  (1998)  doesn't  take 
exception  to this view, but  she develops  it in an  entirely new  way. According to van 
Geenhoven,  non-specific  indefinites  are  ordinary  predicates,  which  neither  possess 
quantificational  force nor  introduce  reference markers or anything of  the  sort. If  the 
indefinite  in (25a), for example, is interpreted non-specifically, it doesn't have narrow 
scope; indeed, it doesn't have scope at all because it is semantically incorporated by the 
verb, as suggested by the paraphrase in (25b): 
(25)  a.  Every man loves a woman. 
b.  Every man is a-woman-lover. 
If, on the other hand, an indefinite gets a specific reading, its semantic representation is 
rather different. Specific indefinites are analyzed  in accordance with the standard DRT 
doctrine  on  indefinites,  save  for  the  fact  that  it  is  stipulated  that  they  must  be 
accommodated. Or in  other words, if  a woman in  (25)  is specific, it is treated as if  it 
were a presupposition-inducing expression whose presupposition has the peculiarity that 
it doesn't want to be bound. Hence, the indefinite is dealt with in  two steps. First, the 
grammar produces the initial  discourse representation  in  (26a), in  which the semantic 
correlate of N  woman is marked as specific, and then this representation is fed into the 
projection mechanism of the binding theory, which treats the indefinite description as it 
would  treat  any  (other) presuppositional  expression, except  that  it cannot  be bound. 
Consequently, it  must be  accommodated, and  since there  is  a general  preference  for 
accommodating things  at the  highest  level  of  representation,  it  is  predicted  that  the 
resulting interpretation will be (26b). 
(26)  a.  [: [x: man(x)](every x)[u: woman(u), x loves u]] 
b.  [u: woman(u), [x: man(x)](every x)[: x loves u]] 
I  find  this  analysis  appealing  for  a  number  of  reasons.  To  begin  with,  it  comes 
essentially  for free, because  all the machinery it employs is already  in place, as  it is 
required  anyway  for  dealing  with  presupposition  projection.  Secondly,  van 
Geenhoven's proposal explains the parallels as well as the differences between definites 
and specific indefinites. The reason why definites and specific indefinites are so similar 
is  that  they  are interpreted by  the same projection  mechanism; the main  difference is 
that definites want, and specific indefinites don't want, to be bound. Thirdly, the theory 
accounts in  a principled  way for the puzzling pattern of  interpretations discussed  in  5 
1.1, which I repeat here for ease of reference: 
in situ < wide scope < intermediate scope 
According to van Geenhoven, indefinites are ambiguous between a specific and a non- 
specific reading, and if  it may be assumed that the latter prevails by  default, then an in 
situ construal is preferred to a reading that involves movement, and if an indefinite gets 
a specific reading, principle  C of  the binding  theory  entails a preference for a wide- 
scope as opposed to an intermediate-scope reading. 
Although van Geenhoven's theory hinges on the premise that specific indefinites are 
construed by way of movement, it should be stressed that this account has nothing to do with  quantifier raising  (or, for that  matter,  any  other  of  the svandard techniques  for 
dealing  with  quantifier  scope). Presupposition  projection  is  a  pragmatic  affair,  and 
therefore  van  Geenhoven's  proposal  can  only  be  seen  as an  attempt  at dealing with 
specificity in pragmatic terms. Quantifier raising, in contrast, takes place at or near the 
syntax-semantics  boundary,  so a theory  based  on  raising  implies that  specificity is a 
grammatical  phenomenon, and  this  view  has  never  been  challenged even  by  authors 
who rejected the rasing analysis. Thus considered, van  Geenhoven's proposal  is little 
short of iconoclastic. 
3.2.  Objections 
Although I applaud van Geenhoven's pragmatic turn, and agree with the fundamental 
intuition underlying  her theory, I have two objections, one of  which I consider to be 
particularly serious. To begin with the major problem, I maintain that van Geenhoven's 
analysis is conceptually incoherent. To my mind, the very idea of a class of expressions 
that insist on being interpreted by  way of  accommodation is a contradiction in  terms. 
Accommodation  is  a  repair  strategy  by  definition.  A  speaker  who presupposes  that 
cp presents cp as given, and if  it is not given it is at the hearer's discretion whether or not 
he wants to play along by  accommodating j. Therefore, accommodation isn't  anything 
like  an  ordinary  rule  of  interpretation;  it  is  a fall-back  option, and  if  one wants  to 
postulate  a  linguistic  category  that  selects  this  option,  there  is  a  fair  amount  of 
explaining to do. 
But can't we simply broaden the concept of  accommodation by  ruling that it applies 
not only to presuppositions but to certain other types of  information, as well? We can, 
of  course, but  there  is a price to pay. A broadening of  the notion  of  accommodation 
entails  that  we  forfeit a  powerful  explanatory  lever  in  our theory  of  presupposition 
projection. For we then  will have to come up with new answers to such questions as: 
What justifies  accommodation?, Why is binding preferred to accommodation?, and so 
on. And as long as I don't see how these questions might be answered, I am not willing 
to pay this price. 
My  slightly  less  urgent  complaint  concerns  van  Geenhoven's  assumption  that 
indefinites  are systematically  ambiguous  between  specific and non-specific  readings. 
Notwithstanding  the fact that this assumption is commonplace in the literature, I don't 
believe  there  is  much  independent  evidence  to  support  it,  but  that  is  as  it  may  be, 
because  nobody  would  deny  that  ambiguities  are  ugly  and  should  be  avoided  at 
practically  any cost. And, come to think  of  it, one should expect that  a specificfnon- 
specific ambiguity can be avoided in a framework based on the insight that specificity is 
a pragmatic phenomenon. 
4.  Specificity and backgrounding 
My proposal is to relate specificity and presupposition to each other, not by reducing the 
former to the latter, as van  Geenhoven has tried, but by  subsuming them under a more 
comprehensive rubric, which I call 'backgrounding'. I will argue that this view doesn't 
suffer from the shortcomings discussed in the foregoing, and, furthermore, that it throws 
a  new  and  perhaps  brighter  light  on  presupposition  as  well  as  on  a  number  of 
phenomena that thus far lacked a systematic account. 4.1.  Foreground and background 
Following Foley and van Valin (1985) and Foley (1994), among others, I understand the 
opposition  between  foreground  and  background  distinction  purely  in  terms  of 
informational  prominence, where  prominence  is  a  relational  rather  than  an  absolute 
notion.  By  uttering  a  sentence a speaker  typically  conveys a considerable  amount  of 
information, only a small portion of which is central to his concerns. The remainder is 
backgrounded  information:  ancillary  matter  that  merely  serves  to  anchor  the 
foregrounded information to the context, or information which is brought in en passant. 
Backgrounded information is not necessarily unimportant, but it is of secondary interest 
in relation  to foregrounded information. Thus the notion  of  background is primarily a 
negative  one:  backgrounded  information  is  what  remains  when  foregrounded 
information is taken  away. It may well be, therefore, that it is impossible to provide a 
single positive description covering all sorts of  background information. But no matter 
how many  reasons for, or ways of, backgrounding there may be, I will  suggest that at 
least some interpretative mechanisms do not discriminate between them. 
A further, and crucial, negative characteristic of  my notion  of background is that it 
doesn't entail givenness; only the converse is true. Backgrounded information may be 
given, or presented as given, but new information  is not necessarily foregrounded. For 
example, enclosing new information in (intonational or orthographic) parentheses often 
serves  to  indicate  that  it  is  of  secondary  importance,  which  is  to  say  that  it  is 
backgrounded, not that it is presented as given. 
My notion  of  background  is  clearly  related  to  Abbott's  (2000) 'nonassertion'  and 
Horn's (2000) 'assertoric inertia'. The basic intuition in each case is that the main point 
of  an utterance enjoys a special pragmatic status, while the remainder is, in some sense, 
downgraded.  What  distinguishes  my  concept  from  the  other  two  is  mainly  that  its 
interpretative effects are more explicit (see below). Apart from that I prefer to avoid the 
notion  of  assertion  in  this  connection,  because  otherwise  I  would  have  to  assume, 
contrary  to  what  I take  to  be  linguistic common  sense, that  assertions  may occur in 
syntactically embedded positions. 
Although  the  distinction  between  foreground  and  background  may be signaled by 
intonational means, I don't  want to  make any substantial claims about the relationship 
between intonation and foregroundlbackground. However, I should like to note that the 
correlation  between  intonational pr0mine.n~~  and  foregrounding  is  imperfect,  at best. 
This observation is not new, but I feel it bears emphasizing nonetheless. Consider the 
following example: 
(27)  The course on postmodern theology will be given by [the  dean]^ 
Suppose, for enhanced clarity, that this is an  answer to the question  'Who is teaching 
the course on postmodern theology this year?', so we can be sure that the non-focused 
part  of  (27) is given, and therefore backgrounded. Now  of  course the focused part  is 
(presented as) given, too, simply by  virtue of the fact that it is a definite NP. But surely 
everything in this statement cannot be given? The solution to this puzzle is not so hard 
to find: the focus on the deun doesn't highlight the dean, but rather the fact that it is he 
who will be teaching the course on postmodern theology. The dean is given; that he will 
play a certain role is foregrounded. 
If  backgrounded information need not be given, there is no reason why it couldn't be 
marked  as new. I want  to suggest that this is not just  an  abstract possibility:  it does happen  that  backgrounded  information  is  marked  as  new;  this  is  precisely  what 
specificity comes down to. 
4.2.  Accessibility and the Buoyancy Principle 
An  utterance is always interpreted within a context, and broadly speaking utterances and 
contexts interact with each other in two ways: the context affects the interpretation of an 
utterance, which in  its turn changes the context in which it occurs. In DRT the context 
of  utterance  is  pictured  as  a  line  of  accessible  DRSs,  and  therefore  the  notion  of 
accessibility is of central importance to DRT (as it is, mututis mutandis, to all dynamic 
theories of meaning). What, exactly, is accessibility? From a technical point of view this 
question is not so hard to answer, but when we interpret the question as being about the 
theoretical  status of  the accessibility relation, many  different answers are possible. In 
Kamp's (1981) original version of DRT, accessibility was associated with anaphoricity 
in  the  sense that  it  was only used  for constraining the interpretation of  anaphora: an 
anaphoric pronoun had to find its antecedent in  an accessible DRS. In  later versions of 
the theory, the notion  of  accessibility gradually  assumed a much  broader significance. 
Thus, as we have seen  in  #  2, in the  binding  theory  of  presupposition  accessibility 
demarcates what is given at the point where an expression occurs. I believe that an even 
broader  view  is  called  for,  and  that  the  accessible  domain  must  be  seen  as  the 
background  against  which  an  utterance  is  interpreted,  where  'background'  is  to be 
understood as explained above. 
When we thus broaden our perspective on the significance of accessibility, it is only 
to  be  expected that  some of  the principles  of  interpretation  hitherto cast  in  terms of 
accessibility will have to be generalized. This applies, in particular, to principle C of the 
binding theory, which I propose to supplant with the following: 
The Buoya~zcy  Principle 
Backgrounded material tends to float up towards the main DRS 
Strictly  speaking,  the  Buoyancy  Principle  isn't  part  of  our  theory  of  presupposition 
projection, because it is not specifically about presuppositions, so all that remains of the 
original  binding  theory  is  two  'axioms',  one saying that  presuppositions  want  to be 
bound, the other, that presuppositions that cannot be bound may be accommodated. The 
theory's  predictions  aren't  affected by  this  change, although they  are  now  seen  in  a 
somewhat  different  light.  In  particular,  I am  no  longer  committed  to  the  claim  that 
presuppositions tend to take 'wide scope' because they are presuppositions; it is rather 
because  they  are backgrounded,  and therefore subject to the Buoyancy Principle, that 
they gravitate towards the principal DRS. But as far as the theory of  presupposition  is 
concerned, the  proposed  modification  isn't  exactly  a  volte-face.  Still, this  relatively 
minor  amendment  may  turn  out  to  be  more  consequential  than  one  should  think, 
because  it  invites  a  rethinking  of  the  binding  theory's  treatment  of  at  least  some 
presupposition  triggers,  as  I  will  argue  in  1 5. The  concept  of  buoyancy  itself  is 
discussed at greater length in Geurts (2000b). 
4.3.  Explaining specificity 
In  keeping with DRT orthodoxy, I regard indefinites as property-denoting expressions 
that  receive  existential  import  when  they  occur  in  argument  positions.  The  main advantage of this division of labor is that it makes for a uniform analysis of indefinites 
occurring  in  argument  positions  and  indefinite  non-arguments,  such  as  predicate 
nominals, for example. To illustrate, it allows us to maintain that a ventriloquist has the 
same meaning in both of the following sentences: 
(28)  a.  Barney is a ventriloquist. 
h.  Betty is married to a ventriloquist 
In  (28a) as well as in  (28b), u ventriloquist merely denotes a property, but only in the 
latter case is this property  applied to a reference marker introduced by  the verb. I will 
assume that, if  this happens, the reference marker in question is labeled as new. There 
are various ways of  accounting for this feature (if it is  one), but that is a topic I don't 
want to go into here. 
Unlike  Reinhart,  van  Geenhoven,  and  many  others,  I  deny  that  indefinites  are 
ambiguous between  a  specific  and  a non-specific  reading:  indefinites  always denote 
properties. If  an indefinite occurs as an argument it may be construed as specific or non- 
specific depending on whether is backgrounded or not, which is to say that the choice is 
a pragmatic  one. Of  course, to say that a given  aspect of  interpretation is a pragmatic 
one is not to deny the possibility that it is conventionally marked in some languages. In 
this respect, specificity is in the same boat as definiteness, which is a pragmatic notion, 
too, and is conventionally marked in some, though by  no means all, languages. 
Following the general  consensus, I take  it that by  default indefinites are construed 
non-specifically, and the most natural way of accounting for this is by assuming that, all 
things  being  equal, an  indefinite will  tend  to be  construed  as part  of  the foreground 
because  it  carries  new  information.  I  still  deny,  of  course, that  new  information  is 
always foregrounded, but it is only natural that the former status tends to be escorted by 
the latter. It is only under special circumstances that new information is backgrounded, 
and if this happens, the expression in question is specific. 
We are now all set to explain the main  facts about specificity, beginning  with the 
interaction  between  indefinites  and  (other)  scope-bearing  expressions.  We have just 
seen  why  indefinites  prefer  to  be  construed  non-specifically;  this  is,  I  suggested, 
because  they  tend  to  be  part  of  the  foreground.  But  if  they  are  backgrounded,  the 
Buoyancy Principle applies, which is to say that, other things being equal, they will take 
wide scope, and only if  all things aren't equal will they take intermediate scope. This is 
precisely  the  order  of  preferences  that  we  wanted  to  account  for.  Secondly,  the 
similarities between  definites and specific indefinites fall into place, too, because both 
types of expressions convey backgrounded information. Thirdly, and by the same token, 
it  is only to be expected that there will be languages which lump together specificity 
with  definiteness, assigning the two functions a single article or case marker, say. On 
the present account, such conventional devices receive a straightforward interpretation: 
they signal that something is part of  the background. Thus a vcv-prefix in  Bemba, for 
example, isn't  ambiguous in any way;  it just  serves to indicate that the expression  it 
attaches to is backgrounded. 
The partitive constraint is explained along the same lines. It is reasonable to suppose 
that, in an expression of the form 'Det a of p', the main duty of  P is to help identify the 
intended a, and  is  therefore backgrounded  (cf. e.g. Kuno  1987). So, properly under- 
stood, the partitive constraint is not that !3  must be either definite or specific, but rather 
that  it must be backgrounded. This explains why definites and specific indefinites can 
occur in partitive constructions, while quantifiers and non-specific indefinites can't. 4.4.  Summing up 
It  will be evident that this analysis of specificity owes a great deal to van  Geenhoven's 
proposal. But my account improves upon van Geenhoven's by giving a coherent picture 
of  the  relation  between  specificity,  on  the  one  hand,  and  presupposition  and 
definiteness, on the  other, while forgoing the premise that  indefinites are ambiguous 
between specific and non-specific readings. Apart from providing a principled way of 
dealing with  specificity, the present  theory offers another attraction  as well, in  that it 
may shed new  light on  matters not directly related to specificity. It  is to these matters 
that we now turn. 
5.  Second thoughts about presuppositions (and sundry other 
matters) 
Being  an  extension  of  standard  DRT, the binding  theory  regards presuppositions  as 
elementa that would like to be bound an antecedent. This is a view that agrees with pre- 
theoretical intuitions about the definite article, for example, but it doesn't seem right for 
some  other  expressions  and  constructions  that  are  standardly  categorized  as 
presupposition  inducers. I want to propose that at least some of these are better viewed 
as instances of backgrounding. 
5.1.  Lexical 'presuppositions' 
Intuitively speaking, the notion  that presuppositions are anaphoroid elements does not 
seem  to  be  quite  appropriate  for dealing  with  lexical  inferences  like the following, 
which have often been  said to be presuppositional in nature (here '>>' is to be read as 
'implies, intuitively speaking'): 
(29)  a.  Leslie is a bachelor 
>>  b.  Leslie is a man. 
(30)  a.  Wilma managed to fry an egg. 
>>  b.  It was difficult for Wilma to fry an egg, 
(31)  a.  Fred accused Barney of nepotism. 
>>  b.  Nepotism is a bad thing. 
It is commonly held that (29a) presupposes (29b), and this claim seems justified by the 
observation that this inference tends to go through even when (29a) is embedded in non- 
entailing environments, such as: 
(32)  Perhaps Leslie is a bachelor 
A  naive  account  of  facts  like this  would  he  to  suppose  that  the  lexical  content of 
huchelor  falls  into  two  parts:  an  assertional  part  which  specifies  that  bachelor  is 
truthfully  predicated only of  unmarried individuals, and a presuppositional part which 
says, among other things, that a bachelor is a man; of course, it is the second half of the 
content of bachelor that triggers the presupposition in (29a) and (32). There are several problems with  this  naive  account. First,  as it  stands, this  analysis implies that  every 
occurrence of  bachelor gives rise to the presupposition  that  the individual it is being 
applied to is a man, and therefore it predicts, for instance, that 
(33)  Betty is allergic to bachelors. 
means something like, 'Betty is allergic to unmarried individuals who are presupposed 
(by someone?) to be men' -  which is not what we want. The solution to this problem is 
fairly obvious: the word buchelor should only be allowed to trigger its presupposition 
when it is being used predicatively. But this seems to entail that bachelor is ambiguous 
between  a  presupposing  and  a  non-presupposing  reading,  which  is  not  exactly  an 
appealing consequence. 
The second problem, which is related to the first, is the following. Suppose that it is 
encoded in the lexicon that predicating bachelor of some individual a carries with it the 
presupposition that a is man. Consider now how the words buchelor and man are related 
to each other: the former is a hyponym of  the latter, and the only distinctive feature of 
the word buchelor is that it applies to unmarried individuals. But at the same time that is 
all  we  are saying, as opposed to presupposing,  when  we call  somebody a bachelor. 
Could this be an coincidence? I think it is pretty clear that it is not. For one thing, other 
hyponyms behave alike: spinster presupposes 'female', woodpecker presupposes  'bird', 
and so on. For another, an  intuitively plausible story about this phenomenon is readily 
available:  if  a speaker wants  to  announce that  Leslie  is  unmarried  and has even  the 
slightest  doubt  about Leslie's  sex  he  would  say that  Leslie  is unmarried  rather than 
risking (29a). I do not want to suggest that spelling out an explanation along these lines 
is going to be trivial, but it is obvious that if such an account could be  made to work it 
would be much more attractive than the one we started out with, which says, in effect, 
that it is a lexical accident that (29a) presupposes (29b). 
There is yet another, and more severe, problem with the suggestion that (predicative) 
bachelor presupposes 'adult male'. It is that this presupposition, if  it is one, is evidently 
not the kind of thing that seeks to be bound in anything like the way anaphoric elements 
seek to be  bound. This becomes quite apparent when  one considers how  the binding 
theory would deal with (32), for example: 
(34)  a.  [x: Leslie(x), perhaps: [: male(x), adult(x), unmarried(x)]] 
b.  [x: Leslie(x), male(x), adult(x), perhaps: [: unmarried(x)]] 
Assuming that (34a) is the semantic representation associated with (32) by the grammar, 
the  binding  theory  predicts  that  the  presupposition  triggered  by  bachelor  is 
accommodated in the principal DRS, because it cannot be bound and there is no reason 
(let  us  suppose)  why  it  should  be  accommodated  locally.  This  yields  the  right 
interpretation  (and as a  matter  of  fact I don't  know  of  any  counterexamples to  this 
analysis  of  bachelor), but  within  the  framework  of  the binding  theory  this  analysis 
causes  something of  an  embarrassment.  The presupposition  supposedly  triggered  by 
bachelor can never be  bound, as there is nothing to bind, so this presupposition would 
be one that, by  its very nature, must always be accommodated, and as I have argued in 
my  discussion  of  van  Geenhoven's  account  of  specificity,  that  is  practically  a 
contradiction in terms. 
The presuppositions allegedly  triggered by  verbs  such  as manage  and accuse  (cf. 
examples  (30) and  (31))  are  dubious,  too,  and  partly  for  the  same  reasons.  Most importantly, it just  doesn't seem to be plausible, from a pre-theoretical  vantage point, 
that the inferences licensed by  these verbs should be of  an  anaphoric nature, and this 
suspicion  is strengthened by  the observation  that it  is next  to impossible to come up 
with examples in which these purported presuppositions must be interpreted by way of 
binding. 
My  proposal  is  to  deal  with  the  lexical  inferences  in  (29)-(31)  in  terms  of 
backgrounding instead of presupposition. According to the theory developed in the last 
section, backgrounded material may be given (i.e. presupposed) but backgrounding isn't 
wedded to givenness, and therefore new information may be backgrounded, too. This, it 
seems to me, is precisely what we witness in the cases under discussion. For example, if 
a  speaker utters  (29a), it  is likely that the essential  bit  of  information  he  intends to 
convey  is  that  Leslie  is  married,  not  that  Leslie  is  an  adult  male.  Therefore,  the 
information that Leslie is a man is backgrounded, which means, I have argued, that it 
will  gravitate  towards  the  principal  DRS,  by  virtue  of  the  Buoyancy  Principle. 
Similarly,  if  someone  utters  (30a),  he  conveys  (30b),  but  he  doesn't  present  this 
information  as  given  (not  necessarily,  anyway).  However,  by  using  this  particular 
expression, the speaker does indicate that the truth  of  (30b) is of less concern to him 
than the fact that Wilma fried an egg. Hence, even if  (30b) isn't given, we may assume 
that is backgrounded. The same, mutatis mutandis, for (31a). 
I have proposed that the lexical inferences  in  (29)-  (31) be explained in terms of 
backgrounding.  This is  not  to suggest, however,  that  these inferences  are alike in  all 
respects,  because  they  aren't.  Speakers'  intuitions  make  a  fairly  clear  distinction 
between  (291, on the one hand, and (30) and (31), on the other. Most speakers would 
say that  if  Leslie  is  a woman, (29a) is false. Whereas, if  it turns  out to  be  easy for 
Wilma to fry an egg, then  it  is  not  so evident  what  we  should say about (30a). This 
statement would be misleading, to be sure, but many speakers would hesitate to simply 
reject  it  as false; similarly  for  (31a). One might  say that, in contradistinction  to the 
lexical entailment in (29), the inferences in (30) and (3 1) are conventional implicatures, 
but in view of  the notorious ill-definedness of the concept of conventional implicature, 
that would do little more than  rephrase the problem. 1 don't  have particularly  strong 
opinions on how the differences between (29) and (30)-  (31) can be accounted for, nor 
am I convinced that  this  issue  is extremely  urgent.  This, however, is  as  it  may  be, 
because what I proposed  in  the foregoing doesn't entail that such differences couldn't 
exist. But these observations reinforce the suspicion voiced  in 5  4.1, that there may be 
various ways of backgrounding, which may not all be equivalent. 
5.2.  Presupposition vs. background 
Over  the  past  few  decades,  but  especially  during  the  presupposition  craze  of  the 
seventies, the label  'presuppoaitional'  has been applied to such a bewildering variety of 
phenomena that the very notion of presupposition has become suspect, as the following 
passage from Neale (1990: 54) illustrates: 
A  great  range  of  disparate  and  unrelated  phenomena  has  been  dubbed 
'presuppositional'  over  the  years,  but  [...I  it  seems  highly  implausible  that  any 
theoretically important notion will do justice to the full range of  data that semanticists 
professing an interest in 'presupposition' seek to explain. 
Needless  to  say, I  am  not  entirely  convinced  that  the  second  half  of  this  claim  is 
justified, but the first half certainly is. All too often, the concept of presupposition has been  used, or rather  abused, without even the shadow of justification.  I have  argued 
elsewhere that  this  abuse was caused  at  least  in  part  because  the diagnostic  tests  for 
presuppositionhood  were (and still are) applied too carelessly, if  they were applied at all 
(see Geurts  1999a). But in  the light of the foregoing discussion I want to suggest that 
there may have been another factor as well, which is that the standard tests don't allow 
us to make a clear distinction between presuppositional and  backgrounding effects, and 
that  at  least  some of  the phenomena  that  have been  categorized,  to  greater or lesser 
acclaim, as  'presuppositional'  are better  seen in  terms of  backgrounding.  The lexical 
inferences  discussed  previously  are  relatively  clear  instances  of  this  category,  and 
further possible candidates for relocation  will be  discussed below. But first I want to 
raise the question how we are going to distinguish between genuine presuppositions and 
instances of backgrounding. 
This is not a trivial question because, as I hinted already, the standard litmus tests for 
presuppositionhood  fail  to distinguish between  presupposition  and backgrounding,  as 
the following observations illustrate (where '>I>' symbolizes the negation of '>>'): 
(35)  a.  If  Germany becomes a monarchy again, the king of France will get 
nervous >z  There is a king of France. 
b.  If  there is a king of France, the king of France will get nervous >/>There 
is a king of France. 
(36)  a.  If  Leslie is rich, he is a bachelor >> Leslie is a man. 
b.  If  Leslie is a man, he is a bachelor >A Leslie is a man. 
(37)  a.  If the king of France gets nervous, his ministers get nervous, too. >> 
There is a king of France. 
b.  If  the king of France gets nervous, then France must be a monarchy >/> 
There is a king of France. 
(38)  a.  If  Leslie is a bachelor, he is rich >> Leslie is a man. 
b.  If Leslie is a bachelor, he is a man >I>  Leslie is a man 
These observations suggest  that  there  are  no  differences  between  the presupposition 
triggered by the definite NP 'the  king of  France', as in  (35) and (37), and the lexical 
inference licensed by the noun bachelor, as in (36) and (38), and the parallels extend to 
all sorts of embedding contexts. Nevertheless, I have argued, there are good reasons for 
believing that lexical inferences aren't  of  a presuppositional nature. But none of these 
reasons provides us with a general criterion  for discriminating between presupposition 
and backgrounding. 
According to the binding theory, presupposed information is presented as given, in 
the same sense that the antecedent of an anaphoric expression is given, and the theory's 
treatment of presupposition is a generalization of DRT's  treatment of  anaphora, which 
is based  on  the  widely  held  view  that  an  anaphoric expression  serves to  retrieve an 
element from the common ground. That is to say, the speaker employs an anaphor not 
merely to signal that a discourse entity x is given, but also as an instruction to the hearer 
that he should identify and recover the intended x, so that new information will have the 
right connections. In  other words, the hearer is expected to ask himself  which entity the 
speaker has in mind. I want to suggest that we can  turn this observation into a useful 
test  for  distinguishing  between  real  presuppositions  and  merely  backgrounded information. The test  goes  as follows: If  x is a genuine presupposition,  then  it  should 
make sense to ask 'Which x do you mean?' when the speaker has just uttered a sentence 
implying the existence of  some x. This admittedly informal criterion indicates that, for 
example, the following are genuine presupposition inducers: 
Pronouns: 
(39)  A:  He is insane. 
B:  Who is insane? 
Definite NP's: 
(40)  A:  The banana has been stolen. 
B:  Which banana has been stolen? 
Quantifier domains: 
(4  1)  A:  Every girl has sent me a postcard. 
B:  Which girls have sent you a postcard? 
Focus particles: 
(42)  A:  Professor Babel has read my paper, too. 
B:  Who else has read your paper? 
On  the other hand, there are various alleged presupposition  inducers that fail  the wh- 
test. The lexical inferences discussed in the previous section are a case in point, as are 
factive verbs and transition  verbs, for example, which are standardly listed among the 
presupposition-inducing expressions: 
Factives: 
(43)  a.  Barney is proud that his daughter is an anarcho-syndicalist 
>>  b.  Barney's daughter is an anarcho-syndicalist. 
Transition verbs: 
(44)  a.  Betty has started taking saxophone lessons [at time t] 
>>  b.  Betty wasn't taking saxophone lessons [before t]. 
The inferences  in  (43) and (44) originate with the factive be proud and the transition 
verb  start,  respectively,  and  they  both  exhibit  the  projection  behavior  that  is 
characteristic of presuppositions. But they also fail the wh-test. In the first case it would 
make no sense to ask which state or fact (or whatever) involving his daughter Barney is 
proud of, and in the second case no hearer would ever wonder which instance of  Betty- 
not-taking-saxophone-lessons  ended at time t. Hence, if  the wh-test is to be trusted, the 
inferences exemplified by (43) and (44) aren't  genuine presuppositions,  and therefore 
they must be explained in terms of backgrounding. 
Zeevat (1992) has proposed a classification of presupposition-inducing expressions 
which  resembles  my  somewhat tentative  distinction  between  genuine presupposition 
inducers  and  expressions  licensing  inferences  that  are  best  understood  in  terms  of 
backgrounding.  Zeevat's  'resolution  triggers'  correspond  to  what  I  call 'presuppositions'  simpliciter;  his  'lexical  triggers',  to  what  I  prefer  to  treat  as 
backgrounding  expressions (the correspondences  are not quite perfect). It would take 
me too far afield  to discuss the theory Zeevat  erects on  his classification, but I would 
like to briefly comment on one of his empirical claims, which, if correct, might be put to 
use for discriminating between presupposition inducers and backgrounding expressions. 
Zeevat  views  lexical  triggers  as  'applicability  conditions'  which  must  be  satisfied 
locally, i.e. ill .situ; and this constraint does not hold, according to Zeevat, for resolution 
triggers. It follows from this that resolution triggers can, and lexical triggers cannot, get 
de I-e construals. The following example illustrates both predictions: 
(45)  Betty believes that the superintendent is a bachelor. 
If  this statement is true, Betty can hardly fail to believe that the superintendent is a man 
(which is the lexical inference triggered by bachelor), but it may well be that she is not 
aware that the person  in question is a superintendent (which is part of the presupposition 
triggered by the definite NP). Unfortunately however, for Zeevat as well as myself, this 
distinction is not as neat as it initially appears to be. Suppose that all Betty knows about 
the superintendent  is that he or she is not married. Would (45) be true or false, under 
these circumstances? Speaking for myself, I believe I might accept the statement as true, 
but even if  other speakers should disagree, they would still have to concede, I think, that 
the matter is not as clear-cut as it seemed to be at first. 
When we turn  away from the standard bachelor-type cases, it becomes even clearer 
that  Zeevat's  observation  is hard  to  maintain. Suppose Fred  tells  his friend  Barney: 
'Wilma fried an egg this morning.' Whereupon Barney reports to his wife: 
(46)  Fred believes that Wilma managed to fry an egg 
Tendentious though it may be, this  statement is clearly correct, and it  need not imply 
that  Fred  believes that  it is (or  was)  difficult for Wilma to  fry an  egg. Therefore, if 
Zeevat's  diagnostic  applied  across  the  board,  this  inference  could  not  be  a  lexical 
presupposition  (in  Zeevat's  terminology)  or  backgrounded  information  (in  mine).  I 
don't know how Zeevat would want to deal with this inference, but since I want to treat 
it as an instance of backgrounding, I cannot employ attitude contexts for distinguishing 
between presuppositions and backgrounded information. 
5.3.  Factives 
Factive verbs are standardly regarded as presupposition-inducing expressions, although 
there is a well-known problem with this view. It is that some factive verbs, at least, do 
not always seem to trigger the presupposition that their complement is true: 
(47)  a.  If Barney should discover that Miss Chambley is rich, he'll propose to 
her. 
b.  If I should discover that Miss Chambley is rich, I'll  propose to her. 
Both  (47a) and (47b) can  be  consistently uttered  by  a  speaker  who  doesn't want  to 
commit himself as to whether Miss Chambley is rich, but unlike (47b), (47a) appears to 
have  a  further  reading,  as  well,  implying  that  Miss  Chambley  is  rich.  In  view  of 
observations such as these it has been suggested that discover belongs to a special class of  'semi-factive'  verbs,  which  are  ambiguous  between  a  presupposing  and  a  non- 
presupposing reading. This unattractive assumption can be avoided if  we approach the 
matter  in somewhat different terms. If  the complement of  a factive verb can be either 
backgrounded  or not, the Buoyancy Principle predicts that something very much  like 
presupposition projection will occur in the former case but in the latter. This view is an 
attractive  one,  I  believe,  because  it  seems  to  correlate  with  our  intuitions  about 
foreground vs. background in  factive constructions. For example, a speaker who utters 
(48a) may be interested primarily in  the fact that Barney knew (48b), or in the fact that 
(4Sb) is true. In the former case, the information in  (48b) is backgrounded; in the latter, 
it is foregrounded. 
(48)  a.  Barney knows that his daughter is an anarcho-syndicalist. 
>>  b.  Barney's daughter is an anarcho-syndicalist. 
Now  if  the  same options  are  available  for the  antecedent  of  (48a), we  predict  that 
backgrounding  the  proposition  that  Miss  Chambley  is  rich  will  imply  that  Miss 
Chambley is rich, whereas this inference will not go through if  the factive complement 
is foregrounded. These predictions appear to be correct. 
5.4.  Concluding remarks 
In  the preceding pages I have argued that a number of  expressions that are standardly 
categorized  as presupposition  inducers are better  viewed as backgrounding devices. I 
suspect, furthermore, that this viewpoint may be of  more general use, and that it may 
help to account for phenomena which have not as yet received a satisfactory treatment. 
Let me mention just two, rather disparate, examples: 
Non-restrictive relative clauses: 
(49)  a.  Fred suspected that Betty, who had been avoiding him of late, had 
discovered about his collection of Neil Sedaka albums. 
>>  b.  Betty had been avoiding Fred of late. 
Felicity conditions on speech acts: 
(50)  a.  Where is my bicycle? 
>>  b.  The speaker doesn't know where his bicycle is. 
Although  it  has  occasionally  been  suggested  that  these  inferences  are  of  a 
presuppositional  nature,  this  position  has  not  gained  much  support  in  the  literature 
(exceptions are Fillmore 1969 and Keenan 1971). Still, both types of  inference seem to 
exhibit the 'wide scope' tendency that is the hallmark of presuppositions. This is harder 
to demonstrate for felicity conditions on  speech acts than for non-restrictive relatives, 
because non-declaratives  dislike being  embedded under operators of  any kind. But at 
least we have conditional speech acts: 
(51)  a.  If my pogo stick is in the attic, where is my bicycle? 
>>  b.  The speaker doesn't know where his bicycle is. That non-restrictive relative clauses behave similarly is easier to show, for instance, by 
embedding (49a) under a weak modal operator, such as perhaps. 
Nevertheless, it seems to me that the majority view is correct, and that the inferences 
exemplified by  (49) and (50)  shouldn't  be  granted  the  status of presuppositions.  In 
particular, the preferred interpretation of non-restrictive relatives is plausibly explained 
in terms of backgrounding: non-restrictive relatives are parenthetical remarks, which are 
backgrounded if anything is. So the Buoyancy Principle surely applies to non-restrictive 
relatives, and I conjecture that it applies to felicity conditions on speech acts, too. 
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